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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this appeal involving a certified question, we must 
determine, as a matter of first impression, whether an 
agreement among members of the National Football League1 
to sell broadcast rights jointly to satellite distributors is 
exempt from scrutiny under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 
SS 1 et seq. Citing the Sports Broadcasting Act (the "SBA"), 
15 U.S.C. S 1291, the NFL sought dismissal of a class 
action antitrust suit brought by Charles Shaw, Bret D. 
Schwartz, and Steven Promislo ("Shaw"). The NFL asserted 
that the rights being sold were "residual" rights in a 
"sponsored telecasting" and therefore within the SBA's 
exemption to the antitrust laws. The District Court rejected 
this characterization, holding that the statutory exemption 
turns on the nature of the broadcast in question and that 
the phrase "sponsored telecasting" exempts only a 
commercially sponsored free broadcast. The District Court 
further observed that the SBA's legislative history 
contradicts the NFL's interpretation and that exceptions to 
the antitrust laws must be narrowly construed. 
 
Accordingly, we must first determine whether the SBA 
unambiguously exempts from antitrust law scrutiny only 
the right to sell those images for commercially sponsored 
free broadcast. If not, we must turn to the Act's legislative 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The members of the National Football League which are parties to the 
agreement and to this action are the: Dallas Cowboys Football Club, 
Ltd.; New England Patriots Football Club; New York Giants Football, 
Inc.; Philadelphia Eagles Limited Partnership; and San Francisco Forty- 
Niners, Ltd. We refer to these members and the League itself collectively 
as the "NFL". 
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history. Because we agree with the District Court that it 
does, we will affirm. 
 
I. 
 
The NFL and its member teams own all rights to make 
and distribute images of football performances (the 
"games") between the teams. By agreement, they permit the 
broadcasting of approximately a dozen NFL games each 
week on free television networks, such as NBC or Fox. 
Because different games are broadcast within different local 
markets, however, any television viewer has free access to 
only two or three NFL games.2 This leaves an unserviced 
market for those NFL games outside a viewer's local 
broadcast area (e.g., the Pittsburgh Steelers fan who lives in 
Los Angeles). With the development and expansion of 
satellite distribution, that market can now be tapped. The 
NFL and member teams entered into a pooled agreement to 
sell jointly their rights in all football games broadcast 
nationwide to a satellite broadcast distributor (DIRECTV) 
which in turn offers those games as an all-or nothing 
package (the "NFL Sunday Ticket") to individual viewer- 
subscribers at a fixed cost per season.3  
 
Shaw filed this class action suit, alleging that the NFL's 
joint agreement with the satellite distributor violates 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act4 and seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief. Specifically, Shaw alleges that the 
combined agreement causes artificially high and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Shaw v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd. , 1998 WL 419765, *1-2 
(E.D. Pa. June 23, 1998). 
 
3. This cost is in addition to the subscriber's monthly satellite access 
fee. 
Id. at *2. 
 
4. The antitrust laws were designed for the protection of the public. 
Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, as interpreted by the Supreme 
Court, agreements which unreasonably restrain trade are illegal. See, 
e.g., Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31 S.Ct. 502, 55 L.Ed. 
619 (1911). To make out a Section 1 violation, plaintiffs must prove: (1) 
a contract, combination or conspiracy; (2) a restraint of trade; and (3) 
an 
effect on interstate commerce. See Fuentes v. South Hills Cardiology, 946 
F.2d 196, 198 (3d Cir. 1991). 
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noncompetitive prices for NFL satellite broadcasts and 
restricts the options available to NFL fans. 
 
The NFL filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 12(b)(6), alleging that (1) the pooled sale to the 
satellite distributor is a sale of "residual" rights in a 
"sponsored telecast" exempted from antitrust law under the 
SBA, and (2) Shaw failed adequately to allege the necessary 
joint action. The District Court denied the NFL's motion on 
both grounds and, at the NFL's request, certified the 
question of SBA exemption for interlocutory review. 5 
 
II. 
 
Congress passed the Sports Broadcasting Act in 1961 in 
response to a federal court ruling6 that the NFL's package 
sale of games to a commercial television network (CBS) 
violated the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1. Its 
purpose was to preserve the availability of NFL games on 
free broadcast television.7 The SBA therefore exempts from 
the antitrust laws: 
 
       any agreement by or among persons engaging in or 
       conducting the organized professional team sports of 
       football, . . ., by which any league of clubs participating 
       in professional football . . . contests sells or otherwise 
       transfers all or any part of the rights of such league's 
       member clubs in the sponsored telecasting of the games 
       of football, . . . engaged in or conducted by such clubs. 
 
15 U.S.C. S 1291 (emphasis added). Our first task is to 
consider the plain meaning of the statute, heeding the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Our appellate jurisdiction lies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1292(b). 
 
6. See United States v. National Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. 
Pa. 1953). 
 
7. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 1087, 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3044 (noting the 
Senate Judiciary Committee's concern for "the public interest in viewing 
professional league sports"). See generally U.S. Football League v. 
National Football League, 842 F.2d 1335, 1346-7 (2d Cir. 1988) 
(discussing history of agreements between the NFL and major television 
networks and history of the SBA). 
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Supreme Court's direction that exceptions to the antitrust 
laws must be narrowly construed.8 
 
As the District Court explained and as the NFL does not 
dispute, the phrase "sponsored telecasting" refers to 
broadcasts which are financed by business enterprises (the 
"sponsors") in return for advertising time and are therefore 
provided free to the general public. Shaw, 1998 WL 
419765, *3. Although the NFL concedes that a package of 
satellite broadcasts sold to individual subscribers is not a 
"sponsored telecasting", it asserts that its pooled sale to the 
satellite distributor is nonetheless within the SBA's 
antitrust law exemption because it constitutes a sale of 
residual or retained rights in the sponsored telecasts, i.e., 
that it is "part of [those] rights." 
 
The NFL correctly asserts that it "still own[s] a partial 
right to the games broadcast by the free networks." Id. at 
*2. It errs when it characterizes its remaining rights as 
rights in the sponsored telecasts. The NFL's underlying 
rights are in the games themselves and, more specifically, 
they include the right to sell the images of those games for 
broadcast through various media. The broadcast rights sold 
to sponsored telecasters do not subsume the separate 
broadcast rights sold to a non-sponsored medium. 9 Each 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. See, e.g., Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 126, 102 
S. Ct. 3002, 73 L.Ed.2d 647 (1991) (holding that exceptions to the 
antitrust laws are narrowly construed, as they circumvent Congress's 
commitment to open competition). 
 
9. The NFL attaches great significance to the fact that the satellite 
broadcasts utilize the same images as the sponsored telecasts, fed from 
the same network television cameras. The use of the same signal for 
broadcast over two media, however, does not render the rights in one 
broadcast derivative of rights in the other. One could just as readily 
conclude that the network television broadcast rights are derivative, and 
constitute part of the NFL's rights in the non-sponsored satellite 
broadcast. The network's provision of cameras and commentary does not 
remove the arbitrariness of calling one broadcast derivative of the other. 
Exemption from the antitrust laws cannot be predicated on the simple 
expedient of assigning ownership of cameras or payment of camera 
crews and commentators to a television network. Rather, it is predicated 
on the "sponsored telecast" of the image, i.e., its transmission in a form 
freely receivable by the public. 
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transaction is a sale of a part of the NFL's underlying right 
in the images of the games, but only the former is exempt 
from antitrust scrutiny. We agree with the District Court 
that one looks to the nature of "the broadcast which goes 
to these particular plaintiffs." Id. at *3. As that court 
observed, to hold otherwise - to adopt the construction 
urged by the NFL - would allow the exception to swallow 
the rule: a sponsored telecast to a limited geographic area 
would secure an antitrust law exemption for nationwide 
sales.10 
 
III. 
 
In light of the NFL's contentions regarding the meaning of 
the statutory provisions, the District Court considered the 
SBA's legislative history and concluded that it 
demonstrated that the Act did not exempt the challenged 
sale. See id. at *4. Although we need not turn to the Act's 
legislative history, we do so because the District Court 
examined it in detail. 
 
Our review of the Act's legislative history also leads us to 
conclude that it clearly reflects Congress's intent, and the 
NFL's express contemporaneous concurrence, that the Act 
address only the sale of games to a sponsored television 
network. See Telecasting of Professional Sports Contests: 
Hearing before the Antitrust Committee of the House 
Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 8757, 87th Cong. 1st 
Sess. at 4 (Sept. 13, 1961) (stating that the bill applies to 
"sponsored telecasting" and "does not apply to closed 
circuit or subscription television");11  Id. at 36 (Aug. 28, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. See id. ("Were the rule otherwise, the NFL could circumvent the 
statutory confines, nullify the statutory scheme, simply by always using 
earlier broadcasts with commercials. . . . [T]o construe the statute that 
way would cause [it] to self-destruct -- an absurd result."). 
 
11. Subsequent congressional hearings characterized subscription 
television as a "program to be received by members of the public only 
upon the payment by such members of a charge, fee, or other form of 
direct compensation." See Subscription Television, Hearings Before the 
Subcommittee on Communications and Power of The Committee on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives, 90th Cong., 
1st Sess. at 2-3 (1967) (quoting H.R. 12435, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., para. 
(hh)). 
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1961) (wherein the NFL Commissioner acknowledged 
"absolutely" under oath his understanding that the bill 
"covers only the free telecasting of professional sports 
contests, and does not cover pay T.V.").12 As the District 
Court observed in its well-reasoned opinion, the NFL 
obtained in the 1961 Act an expressly limited exception to 
"the normal prohibition on monopolistic behavior"; one 
which permitted it to sell pooled rights to sponsored 
telecasters and which expressly did not apply to 
subscription television. The NFL got what it lobbied for; it 
cannot now expect the federal courts to transform"narrow, 
discrete, special-interest" legislation into a far broader 
exemption. Shaw, 1998 WL 419765, *5.13 This is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. See also Chicago Pro. Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 808 F. Supp. 
646, 649-50 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (reviewing legislative history and concluding 
that the SBA's legislative history showed that sponsored telecasting was 
limited to free commercial television); Letter from Charles F. Rule, Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, to the Hon. 
Howard M. Metzenbaum, Chairman, Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust, 
Monopolies, and Business Rights, March 30, 1988, reprinted in Antitrust 
Implications of the Recent NFL Television Contract: Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies, and Business Rights of the 
Commission on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1987) (citing 
legislative history and concluding - as did the FTC - that the SBA 
provides no antitrust immunity to the NFL for its contract with ESPN, a 
cable operator, as that programming is not within the "sponsored 
telecasting" exemption). 
 
The NFL argues on appeal that references in the House records to 
sales to networks and "other potential purchasers" of television rights 
conflicts with a finding that the exemption was not intended to extend to 
broadcasts requiring payment by viewers. This is not so. In the context 
of the 1961 Act, the "other potential purchasers" were quite probably 
other sponsored (but non-network) purchasers, such as local and 
regional television stations. 
 
13. See also Chicago Pro. Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 
671 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 954, 113 S. Ct. 409, 121 
L.Ed.2d 334 (1992) (holding that it is "inappropriate to extend [special 
interest laws] to achieve more of the objective the lobbyists wanted") 
(citations omitted). The Court of Appeals observed that "When special 
interests claim they have obtained favors from Congress, a court should 
ask to see the bill of sale." Id. 
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particularly so, once again, because the Act must be 
narrowly applied.14 
 
IV. 
 
Because we find that the subscription satellite broadcast 
of NFL games is not a part of the NFL's rights to the 
sponsored telecasting of those games and therefore not 
within the Sports Broadcasting Act's exemption to the 
antitrust laws, we will affirm the District Court's decision. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. See supra note 8; see also Chicago Pro. Sports, 961 F.2d at 672 
(noting that "courts read exceptions to the antitrust laws narrowly, with 
beady eyes and green eyeshades") (citations omitted). 
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